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A PROSECUTOR'S VIEW OF THE REVISED
WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE
Robert E. Schillberg*
I am reluctant to criticize this Proposed Code.1 Volunteers, legislators, a paid staff, and a-Citizens' Committee2 which I chaired have
committed a substantial amount of time and effort to making the
Code a reality. It is a good code; its basic layout is more logical and
rational than the existing criminal code,3 and, unlike the present code,
its provisions can be more easily understood by both the public and
professionals. This Code is timely, controversial, and extremely important.4 It has been sixty-three years since the legislature gave substantial consideration to criminal law reform, 5 a period during which
the criminal law evolved from an institution characterized as fair, efficient, personal, and comparatively indifferent to legal niceties, to an
institution which today is basically impersonal, comparatively slow,
and extremely concerned with the criminal's rights. This Code must
be judged by present conditions and standards; the practices and conditions of just a few years ago do not reflect the "real world" of criminal law now. As there appears to be little support for the Code in its
present form, substantial revision of the Code will probably be neces* Prosecuting Attorney, Snohomish County; Chairman of the Citizens' Advisory
Committee on the Revised Washington Criminal Code; B.S., Wisconsin State University, 1957; J. D., University of Washington, 1958.
1. REV. WASH. CRIM. CODE (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as R.W.C.C.].
2. The Citizens' Committee consisted of an ex-offender, two lay members, two defense attorneys, two judges, one police officer, and one prosecutor.
3.

WASH. REV. CODE tit. 9 (1959).

4. Criminal law reform was one of the priorities in the President's Crime Commission Report and was considered a prime objective by the Attorney General's Citizens'
Committee

on Crime. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 126,
(1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S REPORT]; and ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CITIZENS
COMMITTEE, CRIME REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS (1969).
5. The need for criminal law reform has been urged for the past twenty years. The
proposals of the Model Penal Code which commenced in 1952 and culminated in the
Proposed Official Draft in 1962 have been a major impetus to criminal law reform.
Several states already have substantially reformed their criminal codes along the lines of
the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 53a (Special Pamphlet
1972); IDAHO CODE tit. 18 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW ch. 40 (McKinney 1967); ORE.
LAWS tit. 16 (1971). The Washington Proposed Code generally follows these earlier derivations of the Model Penal Code, although some substantial deviations will be noted
infra.
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sary to ensure law enforcement support. Whereas I am firmly convinced this Code is a step in the right direction, it is, nevertheless, my
opinion that the Proposed Code, in its present form, is incomplete and
subject to needed change. Perhaps my opinions are due to my bias as
a prosecutor. In any event, my reasons are set forth in the following
pages.
Basically, I am dissatisfied with the Proposed Code for three reasons: (1) the Code is incomplete; (2) the Code has in many cases imposed an unrealistic burden of proof on the state which will be impractical or impossible to sustain; and (3) the Code has too narrowly
defined and too leniently graded many offenses.
I.

THE CODE'S INCOMPLETENESS

The Proposed Code can only be considered the start of criminal
law reform in Washington. 6 The Code does not deal with two vital
contemporary issues-drugs 7 and gambling. 8 Nor does the Code,
other than in a very minor way, confront the problems of treating and
correcting criminal offenders. :9 In addition, the Proposed Code does
not include within its scope the hundreds of criminal offenses found in
statutes not codified under Title Nine of Washington's Revised Code.
The need for legislative re-examination of the non-Title Nine offenses, which include numerous state, county and city offenses, is exacer6. By asserting that the Code is incomplete, I do not intend to be critical of most of
the work that has been done on the Code. I merely wish to emphasize that the Code is
only one step towards complete substantive criminal law reform in Washington.
7. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 69.50 (1971). My understanding is that the 1971 drug legislation was enacted without a substantial examination by the Washington State Legislature.
8. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.47 (1959). Revision of Art. 2, § 24 of the Washington
State Constitution, which provides that the legislature shall not authorize any lottery,
must be completed before comprehensive gambling legislation can be effective. See Seattle Times v. Tielsch, 80 Wn.2d 502, 495 P.2d 1366 (1972).
An amendment to Art. 2, § 24 was adopted at the 1971 Regular Session to be submitted to the voters at the next state general election. As amended, the section would
read in relevant part:
Lotteries shall be prohibited except as specifically authorized upon the affirmative vote of sixty percent of the members of each house of the legislature or, notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, by referendum or initiative
approved by a sixty percent affirmative vote of the electors voting thereon.
9. The present code provisions dealing with suspending and deferring sentences are
not models of clarity; however, Washington has been a leader in its deferred sentencing
approach. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.240 (1959) and 9.92.060 (1971).
In contrast to Washington's approach, Idaho simultaneously reformed its penal laws
and corrections provisions. See IDAHO CODE tit. 20 (Supp. 1971).
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bated by the fact that the general provisions of the Proposed Code will
apply to these non-Title Nine offenses. 10 The immense .confusion
which would be created by applying the Code's provisions to the
non-Title Nine offenses which were not drafted pursuant to the Code's
provisions is immediately apparent. The problem is illustrated in the
burden of proof area where the Code requires that the state disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt any defense which this "title or another
statute". does not expressly require the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.11 Since no non-Title Nine offenses were
drafted to conform to this requirement of the Code, all non-Title Nine
offenses will have to be re-examined to determine where the burden of
proof now rests.
To prevent unintended results prior to legislative review of the
non-Title Nine offenses, the Code provisions making the Code applicable to non-Title Nine offenses should be eliminated. 1 2 The important
job of re-examining these non-Title Nine offenses remains unfinished.
In re-examining these offenses, every effort should be made not to
impose criminal sanctions on conduct which is not traditionally
3
considered criminal.'
In completing the Proposed Code, a few excellent provisions significantly different from existing law should be expanded. First, the
Code contains an alternative fine provision which would allow the
10. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.050(2) 'Provides that the Code provisions dealing with the
principles of liability, responsibility, justification, classifying offenses, sentencing, and
anticipatory offenses shall apply to every Washington offense defined by statute, unless
otherwise specifically stated. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050 provides that the mental states pre-

scribed by the Code (intent, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence) shall

apply to every Washington crime defined by statute unless there is a clear legislative
intent to impose strict liability. Finally, R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.120 requires the state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any defense which "this title or another statute" does
not expressly require the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

Perhaps re-examination of these non-Title Nine offenses, many of which are misdemeanors, will be prompted by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), holding that no person can constitutionally be imprisoned for any offense, including misdemeanors, unless represented by counsel.
11. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.120.
12. The Code's provision with respect to defenses to non-Title Nine offenses is extremely unreasonable. Unless the non-Title Nine offense "expressly" requires the de-

fendant prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the state must disprove
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Even the Model Penal Code and the Idaho Code

do not go so far. Each provides that the defendant must bear the burden of proof if the
statute "plainly" indicates that the defendant should bear the burden. M.P.C. §
1.12(2)(b); IDAHO CODE § 18-112(2) (Supp. 1971).
13. For a similar recommendation, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE COURTS 97-107 (1967).
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court to fine the defendant twice the amount of his gain in lieu of the
statutory fine in any case in which the defendant acquired property or
money by committing a crime.' 4 This provision should be expanded
to allow the court to impose a fine equal to the higher of twice the
defendant's gain or twice the victim's loss.' 5 The alternative fine provision as modified would more accurately reflect the actual financial
impact of the defendant's criminal conduct and thereby would maximize deterrence of "white collar" crimes perpetrated by solvent individuals or corporations which are not effectively deterred under present
punitive provisions. Second, the Proposed Code, unlike the present
law, has realistically conferred criminal responsibility on corporations
and their agents. 16 This provision should be expanded to criminalize
knowingly receiving benefits of corporate criminal behavior.1 7 This
additional provision would be most useful against organized crime.
II.

THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF
UNDER THE CODE

The Proposed Code has imposed an unrealistic burden of proof on
the state in three ways. First, the requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt what a particular defendant at a particular
time purposely desired (intent), subjectively knew (knowledge), was
consciously aware of (recklessness), or negligently failed to perceive' 8
with respect to every material element' 9 of a particular crime is unrealistic, especially in light of recent Supreme Court extensions of the

14. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.030.
15. The suggested provision was utilized in the proposed federal code, and was recommended by the Prosecuting Attorneys' Association. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL

CODE § 3301(2) (1971); and Minutes of the Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys'
Association Conference, held at Pasco, Washington, Feb. 25-26, 1972.
I would also recommend that the statute provide that all fines collected be used
strictly for law enforcement, or alternatively, be used as a fund to compensate victims.
16. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.070.
17. Such a provision should at least extend to those owning or controlling a substantial portion of the corporation.
18. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020.
19. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020. A "material element" of an offense is defined as any
element of the crime connected "with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to
be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or
excuse for such conduct...." R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(14).
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rights of the criminal defendant. 2 0 Prior to Miranda,2' the state could
often prove the defendant's subjective state of mind through some
form of statement by the defendant, albeit with some inherent discrimination in favor of the more intelligent, experienced, and counseled
defendant. But since Miranda, such statements are rarely available
and can seldom be relied upon. Instead, the prosecutor attempting to
prove the defendant's state of mind must rely on the stock presumptions that.a person intends the normal and natural consequences of his
acts and that a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would
have intended or known of the particular element of the crime. However, even these stand-bys may be ineffective methods of proof under
the Proposed Code's sections 9A.08.030(2) and (3), for the law requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the particular defendant's subjective state of mind at a particular time concerning every material element of the crime. If the Code's mens rea
requirements are literally applied, the state does not sustain its burden
of proof by merely offering rebuttal evidence of what a normal person
in the defendant's situation would have intended or known, where the
defendant testifies that he did not have the requisite knowledge or intent. Although we can reasonably assume that a jury will disregard
obviously false testimony of the defendant, the jury will, nevertheless,
make every effort to follow instructions, and if they have any reasonable doubt as to the particular defendant's state of mind, the defendant will be acquitted. This system of proof may result in substantial injustices.
The Proposed Code's mens rea provisions can be remedied by
simply modifying the mental states section to provide that the state
has sustained its burden if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a
reasonable person acting as the defendant, in the defendant's situation, would have done 8o either intentionally, knowingly or recklessly,
as the case may be. The defendant must then bear the burden of
proving that, unlike the reasonable man, he did not act intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly. This modified system of proof would allow
the jury to draw upon their normal experience and would require the
defendant-the only party to the action who knows exactly what his
20. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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state of mind was-to prove that he should not be measured by the
22
normal experience of a reasonable man.
The second way in which the Proposed Code has imposed an unrealistic burden of proof on the state is the requirement that the prosecution disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any affirmative defense
raised by the defendant unless the statute defining the offense expressly requires that the defendant prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.2 3 The problem is that most affirmative defenses
within the Code have failed to expressly require that the defendant
bear the burden of proof; this is a significant departure from existing
law.2 4 A few examples illustrate the problems created by placing this
burden on the state.
Where the defendant raises the affirmative defense of insanity, the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane
-that the defendant did not lack substantial capacity to appreciate
the natural consequences or criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the law.25 In the case of a hardened criminal, this unrealistic burden is analogous to attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular person could quit smoking when the only
evidence available is the person's thirty-year habit of smoking and a
few half-hearted attempts to stop. Although the Proposed Code's insanity provisions are generally an improvement over present law, 26
requiring the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the
27
evidence as does present law would not be unfair.
22. For a discussion on how a "purposeful" or "intentional" mental state can be
disguised in committing "white collar crimes," see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION,

THE NATURE,

IMPACT AND

PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 14 (1970).

23. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.120.
24. For example, the defendant must prove the defenses of duress and insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence under existing law; under the Proposed Code the state
would have to disprove these defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once they have been
raised. Compare State v. Rasey, 54 Wn.2d 422, 427, 341 P.2d 149, 152 (1959); State v.
Putzell, 40 Wn.2d 174, 180, 242 P.2d 180, 184 (1952); State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485.
496-98, 76 P. 98, 101-02 (1904); with R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.12.010, 9A.16.090.
25. R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010. The insanity defense provides that a person is not criminally responsible if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate the natural consequences or criminality of his conduct or
he lacked capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
26. Compare R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010 with State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740, 750. 314
P.2d 660, 666 (1957).
27. See State v. Putzell, 40 Wn.2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952); State v. Clark, 34
Wash. 485, 76 P. 98 (1904).
Placing the burden of proof of insanity on the state is especially perplexing when one
considers that not only is there no consensus in the psychiatric profession as to what
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Entrapment, another affirmative defense under the Code, exculpates a defendant if a public law enforcement official induced or encouraged commission of the crime when the defendant "did not then
otherwise intend to commit an offense of that nature.12 8 If this defense is raised by the defendant, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crime at the
particular moment it was committed despite the encouragement of the
police. This burden of proof is unwise for two reasons. First, the
defendant, not the state, is in the best position to prove what he would
have done had he not been encouraged. The Model Penal Code adheres to this rationale and requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not intend to commit the particular crime until he was induced. 29 Second, it is irrational to expect
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at
that particular moment otherwise intended to commit the crime. A
well known drug pusher who alleges that a policeman induced him to
sell the drugs could not be convicted unless the state produces testimony or other evidence that the moment before the pusher met the
policeman he contemplated selling the drugs. The requirement of
identifying the time of the actor's intent should be eliminated.
Finally, the Code exculpates a defendant who mistakenly believed a
fact which negates the mental state required for commission of the
offense. 30 If this defense is raised by the defendant, the state has the
nearly impossible task of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
particular defendant did not believe a fact which never existed. The
theory behind this defense is good, but it can be rationally applied
only if the defendant bears the burden of proving he was acting under
a mistaken belief.
Insanity, entrapment, and mistake of fact are just three illustrations
which demonstrate the Code's irrational requirement that the state
criminal insanity is, but also there is no consensus that insanity even exists as an abstract concept. Therefore, it seems absurd to require the state to prove the non-existence

of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. A better approach to the insanity defense in
the criminal context would be to treat insanity, when proved by the defendant, as a

mitigating circumstance in setting the punishment, rather than as an absolute defense
to criminal liability.
28.
29.

R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.100.
M.P.C. § 2.13. However, the Model 'Penal Code requires the defendant to prove

merely that the official conduct created a "substantial risk" that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Compare R.W.C.C. § 9A. 16.100.
30. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040.
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disprove beyond a reasonable doubt an affirmative defense raised by
3
the defendant. Numerous other examples exist throughout the Code. '
This problem can be remedied either by categorically requiring that
the defendant prove all affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the
evidence unless otherwise provided,3 2 or by expressly providing in
each of the above affirmative defenses that the defendant bear the
burden of proof. If this recommendation is rejected, thereby requiring
the state to bear the burden of disproving these affirmative defenses,
at least some provision should be added requiring the defendant to file
written notice of the defense within a reasonable time before the trial
date.
The third and final way in which the Code imposes an unjustifiable
burden of proof on the state is found in the sex offense section. 33 The
Code provides that a person cannot be convicted of rape, sexual misconduct, or sexual contact (except sexual contact in the third degree)
unless there is evidence corroborating the victim's testimony.3 4 Since
such corroborating evidence is often unavailable, the maximum crime
some rape defendants will be subject to is sexual contact in the third
degree, a misdemeanor. 3 5 The corroboration requirement should be
eliminated; the defendant is adequately protected from false accusation by the natural skepticism of the jury and the judge's ability to set
aside a verdict for insufficient evidence. 36 A second unrealistic burden
for the state in sexual offense prosecutions is the requirement that the
state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is older than
a particular age. 37 The defendant will seldom offer information as to
31. Additional affirmative defenses which the state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt under the Proposed Code include intoxication, justification, duress, and the
"extreme emotional disturbance" defense to murder. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.08.080,
9A.16.020, 9A.16.090, 9A.32.020(2)(a). The defendant is in a much better position to
establish these defenses and should bear the burden of proof in order to avoid substantial injustice.
32, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney 1967), requires the defendant to establish affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.
33. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.44. Included in the sex offense section of the Code are the offenses of sexual misconduct, rape, and sexual contact. For a detailed discussion of this
section of the Code see the Note entitled "Sexual Offenses" at p. 223 of this volume.
34. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010.
35. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.090. As a misdemeanor, the maximum penalty for sexual
contact in the third degree is ninety days in jail and a $500 fine. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(3).
36. The Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys' Association recommends that the
corroboration requirement be eliminated. Minutes of the Washington State Prosecuting
Attorneys' Association Conference, held at Pasco, Washington, Feb. 25-26, 1972.
See also, People v. Linzy, II Crim. L. Rptr. 2380 (N.Y. Ct. App., July 7, 1972).
37. For example, the defendant is guilty of second degree rape if the victim is less
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his age, and locating relatives or establishing other means of estab-.
lishing the defendant's age could be a major problem. This could
easily be remedied by inserting a statutory presumption that the defendant is twenty years, old. If the defendant is truly younger than presumed, he can easily prove his correct age.
III.

DEFINITION AND GRADING OF OFFENSES UNDER
THE CODE

Any person actively engaged in law enforcement will naturally form
opinions on what conduct should be punished. Prosecutors are certainly no exception. The Prosecuting Attorneys' Association and I are
of the opinion that a number of offenses under the Proposed Code
have been too narrowly defined and too leniently graded. Although
these opinions are subjective and reflect our own moral biases, they
are nevertheless supported by years of experience in dealing with
criminals and their victims. I (and as indicated, the Prosecuting Attorneys' Association) recommend that the following sections of the Proposed Code be amended as indicated:
Definitions (§ 9A.04.130). The definitions adopted by the Code
are generally very good. However, the term "serious bodily injury,"
which is defined as any injury. (1) creating a substantial risk of death
or (2) causing permanent disfigurement or protracted loss of a body
function, 38 should be amended by eliminating the words "permanent"
and "protracted." If these two words are used to define "serious bodily
injury," substantial debate involving medical testimony may ensue in
crimes such as assault39 on whether the defendant's serious injuries are
permanent or protracted. Such debate would take a great deal of time
and would be largely irrelevant in assessing the defendant's culpability.
Principlesof Liability (ch. 9A.08). The complicity section 40 should
be amended in three ways. First, a person acting with the culpability
otherwise required by the offense should always be liable for causing
than fourteen and the defendant is eighteen or older. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.050. The defendant is guilty of third degree rape if the victim is less than sixteen and the actor is

twenty or older, or if the victim is under sixteen and the same sex as the actor and the
actor is nineteen or older. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.060.
38.

R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(23).

39.

R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010.

40.

R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.060.
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another to commit the crime. 41 The Code, for no logical reason, limits

liability under this section to cases where the actor causes an irresponsible or innocent person to commit the offense. 42 Second, a person
who recklessly or with criminal negligence solicits, commands, en-

courages, or requests another to commit a crime should be an accomplice in the crime. As the Code presently reads, a person is an
' 43
accomplice only if he "intends to promote or facilitate the crime.
This is too narrow. 44 And finally, the Code should be amended so that
victims are not automatically excluded as accomplices. To exclude all
victims as accomplices may create problems in vice areas involving

drugs, gambling, alcoholism and sex offenses.
Anticipatory Offenses (ch. 9A.28). The affirmative defense of renunciation 45 and the multiple conviction provision 4 6 may be acceptable
if modified to expressly require the defendant to prove renunciation
by a preponderance of the evidence, 47 and to allow convictions for

both the substantive and inchoate crimes, limiting the maximum punishment to that specified for the substantive offense. The Prosecuting

Attorneys' Association recommends that both provisions be elimi48
nated.
Homicide (ch. 9A.32). Three changes are needed in this section.
First, a provision should be added assuring that persons convicted of

first degree murder will not be released prematurely. Such a provision
49
is especially important in view of the abrogation of the death penalty.
I favor the recommendation of the Attorney General's Citizens'
Committee that prevents a prisoner convicted of first degree murder
from being released unless three conditions are met: (1) the prisoner
41. The present law includes such persons as principals in the crime. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.01.030 (1959).
42. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.060.
43. Id.
44. For example, a person who solicits an individual who is under the influence of
alcohol to race an automobile probably does not intend that the driver kill another, but
logically this person should be a principal to the crime if the driver does kill another.
45. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.040.
46. The multiple conviction provision prohibits a defendant from being convicted
(1)of both the substantive offense and an inchoate offense, or (2) of more than one inchoate offense for the same conduct. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.050.
47. This is another example of an affirmative defense which the prosecutor cannot
reasonably be expected to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text, supra.
48. Minutes to the Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys' Association Conference, held at Pasco, Washington, Feb. 25-26, 1972.
49. Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).
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has served a minimum of fifteen years' imprisonment, (2) the warden
and parole board have granted approval, and (3) a hearing in the
local community has been conducted which results in a recommendation of release. 50 Such a provision would giye citizens assurance that a
person convicted of first degree murder would not be released without
the local community's approval.
Second, first degree manslaughter, 51 which has an expressed penalty of not more than twenty years, should be classified as a regular
first degree felony carrying a penalty of not less than twenty years.
This change would eliminate the uncertainty inherent in the existing
penalty and would be more consistent with the severity of the offense.
Third, a simple homicide provision carrying a gross misdemeanor
penalty should be added to the Code.52 Under the Proposed Code and
existing law, a person is criminally responsible for killing another only
if he has been grossly negligent. One of the most difficult jobs for a
prosecutor is trying to explain to the victim's family that the present
vehicular homicide law does not apply to a person who has been negligent or violated a statutory duty. There is no compelling reason why
simple negligent homicide should not be criminally punished.
Assault (ch. 9A.36). Two changes are recommended in this section.
First, placing another in fear of physical injury, which currently is not
proscribed under the assault provision of the Code, should be a third
degree assault. The actor who places another in fear of physical injury
53
is just as culpable as the actor causing the injury. Second, menacing,
which is defined as intentionally placing another in fear of death or
serious bodily injury, should be classified as a second degree felony.
The drafters have seriously underrated the severity of nenacing by
classifying it as a misdemeanor.
Sex Offenses (ch. 9A.44). My only recommendation is that the
qualified affirmative defense of mistake of age54 be eliminated. The

50. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CITIZENS' COMMITTEE,
lIONS (1969).

CRIME REPORT, RECOMMENDA-

51.

R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.030(2).

52.

The maximum penalty for a gross misdemeanor is one year imprisonment and a

$1,000 fine. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(2). The Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys'

Association concurs in this recommendation. Minutes of the Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys' Association Conference, held at Pasco, Washington, Feb. 25-26, 1972.
53. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.040.
54. The defendant can assert mistake of age as an affirmative defense in cases where

the victim is less than eighteen but older than fourteen. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(2).
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Proposed Code has already lowered the age of consent from the present law; reasonable brackets of age differentials are also provided. 55
If young people are to be protected by these statutes, the mistake of
age defense should be stricken.
Arson (ch. 9A.48). There are two recommended changes for this
section. First, a person should be guilty of first degree arson 5 6 if he
"reasonably anticipated" that another person was in the building before causing the fire or explosion. The Code presently requires that
the prosecutor prove that the defendant was criminally negligent in
not knowing of another's presence. This is too narrow.5 7 Second, the
criminal mischief provisions 58 of the Code have been underrated and
should be raised one degree. 5 9
Burglary (ch. 9A.52). Four major changes are recommended in this
section. First the definition of "building" 6 0 should be expanded to include fenced-in property. Second, the definition of "unlawfully remains"61 should expressly include a case where the defendant lawfully
enters the premises but remains past closing hours. Third, first degree
burglary should be expanded to cover the burglar who assaults another during the burglary even though no deadly weapon is involved. 62
Finally, the Prosecuting Attorneys' Association recommends that
the third degree burglary provisions be merged into the second degree
provisions. The Prosecuting Attorneys' Association believes these four
55. See Note entitled "Sexual Offenses" at p. 229 of this volume.
56. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.0 10.
57. Criminal negligence under the Code requires that the defendant be grossly negligent. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020. A standard of "reasonable anticipation" would punish
the defendant who manifested ordinary negligence. Since the law seeks to prevent all
potentially dangerous burnings, the broader standard is recommended.
58. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.060.
59. In addition, these provisions should be rewritten to require the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed he had the right to
damage the property of another. In its present form, the Code requires the state to disprove any such reasonable belief beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys' Association concurs in this recommendation. Minutes to Washington State Prosecuting Attorneys' Association Conference,
held at Pasco, Washington, Feb. 25-26, 1972.
60. "Building" is defined in R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.005(1). For a discussion of the significance of this term as it relates to burglary, see the Note entitled "Burglary" at p.
242 of this volume.
61. "Unlawfully remains" is defined in R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.005(4). For a discussion
of the significance of this term as it relates to burglary, see Note entitled "Burglary"
at p. 241 of this volume.
62. The rationale for increasing the penalties for persons who are armed is to deter
violence. The same rationale applies to increasing the penalty for persons causing the
violence.
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changes to be necessary if burglary is to be properly and rationally
graded under the new Code. My personal belief is that the third degree burglary provision should be kept separate, but that the presumption of intent applicable to first and second degree burglary should
extend to third degree burglary.
Theft and Robbery (ch. 9A.56). Three changes are suggested for
63
the crime of theft. First, the definition of "permanently deprive"
should be amended to require that "a significant portion" of the property's ecohomic value must be taken from the owner instead of "the
major portion." This change would obviate the necessity of proving
that over fifty percent of the property's value has been lost. Second,
Washington's present "joy ride" statute6 4 should be retained and its
counterpart in the Code-unauthorized use of a vehicle 6 5-- should be
eliminated. The existing statute imposes a ten year penalty, while the
Proposed Code imposes a maximum penalty of only one year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine in cases in which the vehicle is not substantially damaged. 66 Finally, the amounts taken in a series of related
thefts should be accumulated in determining if the offense is to be
first, second, or third degree theft. 67 An embezzler who accumulates
property by a number of related thefts is certainly as culpable as the
embezzler who acquires a like sum in just one effort.
The Prosecuting Attorneys' Association has two recommendations
for first degree robbery: 68 the defense that the actor's firearm was unloaded should be eliminated, and the actor should be guilty of first
degree robbery if he causes physical injury. The second recommendation is most reasonable; however, I personally favor the retention of
the firearm defense because the defendant bears the burden of proof
and the existence of this defense discourages the use of loaded
firearms.
63. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.005(3).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.020 (1959). This statute prohibits the taking of the vehicle of another without permission.
65. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.070.
66. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.070(2) and 9A.20.020(2). If the vehicle is substantially damaged by the actor's recklessness or negligence, the offense is elevated to a third degree

felony and the maximum punishment is five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.070(2) and 9A.20.020(l)(c).
67. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.020-.040 grade theft as follows: If the amount taken exceeds
$1,500 or is taken from the person of another, the offense is first degree theft; if the

amount taken exceeds $250 or a public record or credit card is taken the offense is
second degree theft; if the amount taken is not more than $250, the offense is third degree theft.
68. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.170.
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Fraud (ch. 9A.60). Three changes are suggested for this section.
First, forgery in the first degree should include the conduct proscribed
in second degree forgery. 69 There is simply no logical reason to punish
the forgery of stamps or securities more severely than the forging of
wills or public records. Second, third degree forgery,7 0 which proscribes the alteration of any writing not specified in the two higher degrees, should be changed to second degree forgery and graded as a
third degree felony rather than a gross misdemeanor. Finally, the offense of deception, 7 1 which punishes as a gross misdemeanor the act
of deceitfully causing another to sign a written instrument, should be
graded in degrees on the basis of the amount of property subject to the
fraud. Such a grading system would resemble the theft provisions and
would be extremely useful in frauds involving complicated credit
72
transactions.
CONCLUSION
My criticism of the Proposed Code is not intended to discourage
passage or to retard criminal law reform in Washington. On the contrary, it is hoped that this criticism will stimulate thought, lead to improvements of the Code, and eventually facilitate the adoption of a
new criminal code.
The profound advantages of the Proposed Code cannot be overlooked. Above all, the Code provides a rational means of classifying
offenses which can be readily understood and will be far easier to
teach. This logical classification of offenses will also be advantageous
in the long run because it will enable accumulation of meaningful and

69. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.010 defines as first degree forgery the forging of stamps, securities, stocks and bonds. Second degree forgery includes forging of wills, deeds, contracts and other commercial investments. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.020.
70. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.030. Under the Proposed Code, third degree forgery is a
gross misdemeanor.
71. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.040.
72. Other significant changes that should be made in the Proposed Code include the
following: the penalties for bribery (R.W.C.C. § 9A.68.010), perjury (ch. 9A.72), and
riot (§ 9A.84.010) should be increased; the hindering prosecution provisions (R.W.C.C.
88 9A.76.050-.065) should be modified so as to not require proof of the commission of
the underlying crime; the escape provisions of the Code (R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.76.090-.1 10)
should be modified to carry penalties equal to the charge from which the defendant escaped; and bail jumping (R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.76.140-.150) should carry the same penalties
as escape.
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useful records.7 3 Computer storage of these records will foster effective, high volume justice at a reasonable cost. Also, it will greatly facilitate evaluation of the effectiveness of various criminal sanctions.
Yet despite the advantages of the Proposed Code, substantial work
is required before the Code should be adopted. It is my sincere hope
that the Proposed Code receives the consideration it deserves from the
legal profession, the law enforcement establishment, and the public so
that meaningful and extensive criminal law reform will become a
reality.

73. Substantial problems of coding and space availability are already being encountered in collecting this kind of information due to lack of rational classification and
organization of crimes.
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